On December 30, 2019, Dr. Li Wenliang[1], an ophthalmologist in Wuhan, disclosed information about the COVID-19 outbreak in a WeChat group. The chat records quickly spread, making him a whistleblower in the global pandemic. In China, people often compare Li Wenliang with Jiang Yanyong[2], a whistleblower during the 2003 SARS outbreak. Unlike Jiang, who relied on mainstream media and international outlets, Li’s message spread through social media, highlighting the shift in communication channels from public media to social media.

This shift is not coincidental. Over the past four years, the primary function of public media has been to disseminate government information. Although some media can still conduct in-depth investigative reporting, these efforts are insufficient to alter the decline of the news industry. Under strict censorship, public discussion has been suppressed, media lack the ability to supervise power, and citizens’ rights to participate in public affairs have been severely violated. The annual rankings of press freedom by Reporters Without Borders reflect the reality of Chinese public media.

Conversely, China’s mobile media is highly developed, with platforms like WeChat, Weibo, QQ, Douyin (TikTok), and Xiaohongshu flourishing. During the pandemic, the dissemination model exemplified by the Li Wenliang incident was widely replicated. People habitually share various chat records, short videos, and rumors through private channels such as WeChat groups and Douyin comment sections, bypassing public media.

The reasons for this phenomenon extend beyond the nature of social media itself; they are deeply rooted in China’s political control. Since 2013, China has intensified its control over speech and thought, initially targeting public media. Journalists experience this shift firsthand: news that can be openly published on social media undergoes strict censorship or cannot be published in newspapers. This control sparked protests, such as the 2013 Southern Weekly incident[3], in which I participated.

Content produced by social media cannot fully replace genuine public media. Social media content tends to be emotional and radical, serving as social currency rather than facilitating public discussion. In contrast, public media content undergoes rigorous news production processes, aiming to serve public discourse and uphold the public’s right to know, which is essential for public participation.

However, my view of social media is not entirely negative. During my visit to Tokyo in October 2022 as a research scholar, I studied Chinese social media’s discourse on Japan. Initially, I believed that racist sentiments were prevalent on social media. Surprisingly, I found that social media offers significant advantages in providing Chinese readers with authentic voices from abroad, such as daily life details in Japan, which contrast with the anti-Japanese rhetoric in Chinese public media.

Despite the global challenges posed by social media to public media, the evolution of media in China requires consideration of its unique context. The People’s Republic of China, as its name suggests, is rooted in a century-old intellectual pursuit of transitioning from an imperial dynasty to a modern republic. Yet, even in 1989, during the pro-democracy Tiananmen protests, most Chinese citizens lived in rural areas, unfamiliar with modern political concepts. Their political knowledge was shaped by the propaganda of the socialist transformation post-1949.

The modernization of daily life for most Chinese people just began in the 21st century. With China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and rapid urbanization( 37.6% in 2001)[4], coupled with explosive growth in information technology and new media, China’s role in global politics, economy, and society has become significant. However, many Chinese people still lack basic political knowledge(republic, nation-state, freedom of speech and other concepts) and public participation awareness, partially explaining the low public participation consciousness among mainland Chinese immigrants in Canada.

The future impact of this dynamic on China and the world is uncertain. Nonetheless, I believe social media will play a crucial role. It can either incite racist sentiments or be leveraged to help Chinese people develop different political ideas.

In China, my work, and that of my peers, differs from our counterparts in Canada. Instead of providing public information services to mature citizens, we are more like participants in a social movement called Republic.

Specifically, my work involves using international reporting to foster a more rational understanding of the international community and modern nationhood.

In 2001, my mentor Professor Li Xiguang and I published a paper Who Is Setting Chinese Agenda analyzing that internet media, particularly foreign media contents published in Chatroom Online(BBS), would bypass China’s propaganda system, influencing Chinese media development. [5]Since then, my work has focused on cross-cultural communication, attempting to influence Chinese political views through reporting on global issues, such as ethnic conflicts and economic and social transformations in other countries.

Three years ago, I left the Chinese media industry entirely. After moving to Canada, I ceased writing columns for the Chinese edition of the Financial Times and started my YouTube channel and Twitter commentary. Regardless of whether it becomes a livelihood, I believe it is important to help Chinese people realize the significance of public participation and understand the world.

After the outbreak of the Gaza War on October 7, 2023, I began writing and giving interviews to share my observations and thoughts on the Israel-Palestine issue.[6] I have been observing and analyzing the discourse on Chinese social media. The presence of racial and religious hatred in these discussions deeply concerns me. It makes me very pessimistic and uneasy about the future of the Xinjiang issue. Therefore, I continuously express my views against hate speech. I believe that even if Chinese journalists can no longer work in public media, they can continue to speak out and engage in public expression on social media.

Anyway, I will continue this work.

(The essay translated by Chatgpt from Chinese to English)

References

China’s Digital Nationalism and Activism. (2021). The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/chinas-digital-nationalism-and-activism/

Contested Disaster Nationalism in the Digital Age. (2021). Review of International Studies, Cambridge. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/contested-disaster-nationalism-in-the-digital-age-emotional-registers-and-geopolitical-imaginaries-in-covid19-narratives-on-chinese-social-media/F335EE7D2EA3B0D8D873254FC2B5559E

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Wenliang

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Yanyong

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Southern_Weekly_incident

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urbanization_in_China

[5] https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203563229-16/setting-chinese-agenda-xiguang-li-qin-xuan-randolph-kluver

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kth7bhwCA1s&t=427s